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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Problem
This paper proposes to examine the logic of analogy as a form of
religious discourse in the writings of Eric Lionel Mascall and Charles
Hartshorne. The problem is to exhibit the response of these men to
the question:. In what way and to what degree is discourse about God
analogical?
Delimiting the Scope
A number of factors limit the scope of this study. First, the use
of analogy as a theological method has a rich and intricate history.1
Secondly, there is selective judgment in the decision to utilize the
doctrine of analogy in St. Thomas Aquinas as representative of all
theological analogy. Manifold interpretations of his doctrine alone
have been penned and any portrayal of said doctrine is at best an
approximation of a highly complex teaching. Thirdly, it will be assumed
by the writer that there is a degree of familiarity with the antimetaphysical bias of "logical positivism" or "logical empiricism"
which stands as the backdrop of any study which attempts to deal with
the question of theological discourse and its cognitive validity.
For the sake of review some of the most basic theses of a dogmatic
philosophical "empiricism" may be summarized as follows:
a. The function of philosophy is logical analysis...philosophy
has become the logical analysis of science through the syntactical analysis of scientific language.
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b. All cognitively significant (meaningful) discourse is divisible
without remainder into analytic or synthetic propositions.
c. Any propositionAhatIpurports to be factual or empirical has
meaning only if it is possible in principle to describe a
method for its verification.
d. All metaphysical assertions, being neither analytic nor synthetic propostions are meaningless.
e. There is a single language for all science; it is similar in
form to the language of physics, and all synthetic propositions
are reducible to elementary experiences expressible in this
language.
f. All normative assertions, whether positing moral, aesthetic,
or religious values, are scientifically unverifiable, and are 2
therefore to be classified as forms of non-cognitive discourse.
Fourthly, selection from the writings of the men in question was functional.
This is particularly true in the case of E. L. Mascall who serves to
illustrate the radically analogical position against which Hartshorne
reacts and equally true in the case of Ian T. Ramsey who serves only as
an illuminative parallel to Hartshorne's doctrine of analogy and religious
language. Properly stated, then, this study will attempt to delineate
the doctrine of analogy and religious language in the writings of Charles
Hartshorne, Mascall and Ramsey serving as functional points of contrast
and comparison respectively.
Purpose and Importance of this Study
The question of the validity of religious language in a secular
age is one to which theology must definitively address itself. Linguistic
analysis has hurled the charge of the impossibility and nonsensicality
of theological assertions at the door of theology. Such a charge, unless
defused, aims to detonate the core of the systematic enterprise. Analogy
has been regarded as one method of defusing the analysts' bomb. If this
is true, then it must be vitally central to the whole task of systematic
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theology.3 Such statements as the one by W. S. Taylor that "analogy has
been regarded as being of the greatest homiletic and pedagogic value in
communicating the truth, but as of questionable value in apprehending the
truth"4 deserve examination through comparison with those who speak
with theological and philosophical eloquence on the matter. Such a
study also has fringe benefits. Both John Macquarrie in his God-Talks
and Schubert Ogden in his The Reality of God6 indicate that the issue
of analogy is central in the writings of such theological giants as Barth
and Bultmann. In short, if analogy is capable of establishing the validity
of theological discourse, then it is of inestimable value to the systematicianapologete in his dialogue with the world.
One important aspect of this study may be the oblique way in which
it demonstrates how the suppositions of a system determine the range of
its flexibility and the degree of its insight. This may be tacitly seen
in the degree to which the supernaturalism of Thomism necessitates its
own peculiar doctrine of analogy, and the panentheism of Hartshorne logically
entails its own type of teaching on analogy and religious language. It
is hoped that both the subtlety and complexity of the relationship between
suppositions and their derived effects will be perceived in these systems.

Methodology and Sources
The methodology of this study is designed to respond to the basic
problematic question aforementioned by dealing with Mascall, as a representative of Thomism, and Ian T. Ramsey, as one to whom Hartshorne
acknowledges his indebtedness, in relation to and in,contrast and comparison
with Charles Hartshorne. In so far as Hartbhorne finds great argument with
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classical Thomism and its doctrine of God which, he claims, forbids genuine
analogy) Chapter II will briefly survey the general Thomistic doctrine of
God as it substantiates the doctrine of analogy and then offer a brief
view of Mascall's interpretation of the logic of analogy and his theory
of knowledge which undergirds the same. This chapter will also point
to some current misgivings concerning such a doctrine of analogy as cognitively
valid. Chapter III will offer a brief explication of the "neoclassical"
or "panentheistic" doctrine of God as the logical basis for understanding
Hartshorne's statements on analogy and religious language in Chapter IV.
Chapter IV will present those statements. Chapter V will offer an
exposition of Ian T. Ramsey's views on religious language. This will
be done on the recommendation by Hartshorne of the second chapter of
Ramsey's Religious Language: An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases,
a work, incidentally, which Hartshorne views as germane to his - awn thinking.
Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the study and offers some tentative conclusions and critical questions.
Major sources used in the study include some of the writings of the
men mentioned above. Specific attention, as can be seen in the bibliography,
is given to the writings of Charles Hartshorne. None of the writers were
read exhaustively. Rather, a representative sample was sought. The
initial unfamiliarity with the nature of analogy necessitated widespread
reading in the general area of analogy and religious language.

CHAPTER II
THE THCflISTIC DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY:
AN INTERPRETATION
The basis of the Thomistic doctrine of analogy is found in the
metaphysical presuppositions concerning the nature of God. For St.
Thomas the question of ontology precedes that of epistemology. The
five proofs for the existence of God establish his reality, only thereafter does the search for God's essence, for what he is, become operative.
It is axiomatic that we do not confront God in the same manner in which
we confront existent things. We know God only indirectly, obliquely.
What can be known is his creative causality. Thus, St. Thomas asserts
that by virtue of our awareness of effects, all of which imply a cause,
we are led
to know of God that He exists, and to know of Him what must
necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things,
exceeding all things caused by Him. Hence we know His relationship with creatures, that is, He is the cause of all things;
also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He is not in
any way caused by them; and that His effects are removed from
Him, not by reason of 4ny defect on His part, but because He
superexceeds them all.
As this first cause, God is simple,8 that is to say, He is not a body
composed of matter and form:9 Rather, He is pure form.1° As pure form,
there is no distinction between existence and essence, between that He is
and what He is. Any rift between these two would place God in the
category of caused things. His unity forbids placement in any genus.
Similarly, it eschews contingency.
St. Thomas established rigorous canons of knowledge which set
limits both on the cognition of God and on attribution to Him. According
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to Aristotle, Thomas's mentor, we derive the knowledge of an object
through genus, differentia, accidents, or properties. By St. Thomas's
very definition of God genus, differentia, and accidents are excluded
as a means of knowing God's essence. Properties, however, can be
applied to God in three ways. First, there are negative properties or
attributes such as simplicity, infinity, immutability, etc. Secondly,
there are the names which describe a relationship, such as First Cause.
Finally, there is positive attribution, for example, "good," "wise,"
11
"loving," etc.
It is in the third category, the category,of positive attribution,
that Thomas makes the familiar distinctions between univocal, equivocal
and analogical attribution. In Book I, chapters

30-34, of

his Summa

Contra Gentiles Thomas acknowledges that attributes which we abstract
from the particularity of human finitude are applied to God and present
12
in Him in the appropriately divine form.
It is to be remembered, however,
that ultimately all properties are reducible in God to a simplicity that
is the hallmark of His unity. In so far as God is He in whom essence and
existence are united, His mode of being forces us to refine our speech
about Him. Such caution about positive attribution drives us onto the
path of negation. Such humble reticence demeans the possibility of
applying human qualities in the same sense or univocally. Such predication
would mean the transcription of God into an anthropomorphic super-man
reminiscent of mythological heroism. On the other hand, since God is the
source of all creaturely attributes, it is not admissible to treat those
applied attributes equivocal1y, that is to say, in such totally different
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senses that their only claim to commonality is the form and sound of
the written or spoken word. Thomas cites the example of using the word
“clubil to refer to a weapon and to a group of people.13 The danger of
such equivocation with respect to atttibutes applied to God is that it
14
results in "metaphysical agnosticism,fl a stark emptiness with respect
to the content of our assertions about God.
The recognition of such a range for theological predication - from
univocity to equivocity - establishes, as one writer has noted, logically
disjunctive polarities by which to conceive the relationship of God and man.
On the one hand, there is univocal identity, absolute likeness, immanence,
pantheism; on the other hand, there is equivocal separation, dissimilarity,
transcendence, atheism.15 Between the Scylla and Charybdis of such disjunction the Thomistic doctrine of analogy winds its way as the via media.
Ferre states the crisis and the solution this way:
There seems no escape. If univocal, then language falls into
anthropomorphism and cannot be about God; if equivocal, then
language bereft of its meaning leads to agnosticism and cannot
for us be about God. But at this point it is the contention of
a major theological tradition that between the univocal and the
equivocal lies a third logically important employment of language
which can provide theological discourse with a live alternative
to both anthropomorphi9m and agnosticism. This "middle way" is
the logic of analogy.
This doctrine of the "middle way" spreads out diversely in many
of St. Thomas's writings. The following presentations of various categories
of analogy are meant to reflect a cautious judgment and reserve in selection.
There have been a number of exhaustive treatments of this doctrine in
St. Thomas, more than one of which notes that there is no uniform doctrine
of analogy readily perceptible.17
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In Book I, chapter 34, of Summa Contra Gentiles two types of analogy
are distinguishable. These are the analogy of proportion or attribution
and the analogy of proportionality.
The analogy of attribution is divided further into two classes,
analogy duorum ad tertium and analogy unius ad alterum, the former being
dependent on the latter. In the first of these, multiple entities are
unified by a common attribute which refers to a third entity which the
18
many (or the two) have as a common background or point of reference.
As an example, Thomas refers to the one health, common to all, by which
we are able to say that Dan animal is healthy as the subject of health,
medicine is healthy as its cause, food as its preserver, urine as its
sign.u19 The adjective, "healthy," then, can be applied to Florida as
a place which brings about health or to the complexion of the person
living there, but both cases have meaning only as that adjective applies
fundamentally to the person as the third entity in which these diverse
forms of the adjective find their common rootage. Here Mascall says,
'
,It is he (the person) who is (in the scholastic sense) formally healthy
20
and is the prime analogate.“
As a mode of theological discourse, however, this first type is
deficient in that there exists no third being antecedent or anterior to
God and the creature to whom predicates can apply formally. Such a
deficiency necessitates a more direct type of analogy, that of attributionproportion unius ad alterum. In this case the prime analogate possesses
characteristics in a "formal" manner, in the full univocal sense, while
its analogate participates in the characteristic or attribute only relatively
or in a derivative sense.21 Thus, an asymmetrical relationship obtains
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between the two analogates. God, in order to insure the validity of
religious discourse, ought to possess all characteristics formally in
order that human attributes may be used analogously, albeit relatively.
It is, however, a major contention of Mascall that there are limitations
to this analogy of extrinsic attribution, the analogy unius ad alterum.
Mascall calls to his aid the distinction in St. Thomas between the formal
possession of attributes and virtual possession. The logic of the
distinction is as follows:
Creatures are good (formally but finitely), God is the cause of
them all and of all that they have, therefore the word "good"
applied to God neRa not mean any more than that he is able to
produce goodness.
This type of analogy, then, tells us little more than that God is the
cause of finite phenomena, itself a suspicious analogy open to the
criticism of cognitive invalidity (infra, pp. 14-15)
In so far as the analogy of attribution results in a skepticism
with respect to formal knowledge of the properties of God, the analogy
of proportionality is often utilized to counter the negative effects
of that skepticism. This form of analogy serves as an antidote by
asserting that any word which is applied to two entities is literally
true of both, although the predicate will be understood in light of the
mode or manner of being appropriate to the being in question. Thus
the word "leg,“ for instance, can apply to that of a table or of a man2
but only if we take note of the similarity of function designated by that
word on the one hand and the general dissimilarity by virtue of their
23
quite different modes of being on the other hand. This type of analogy
is not to be confuse] With metaphorical comparison. In metaphor a similarity
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of effects between two entities does not necessitate that both possess
the same formal characteristic as in this analogy. Thus, for example,
a lion so designated the 'king of beasts' does not possess the formal
characteristic of kingship even though we designate his dominating role
as similar in effect.
Commonly, the analogy of proportionality takes on a "quasi-mathematical"
form:
attribute of x
attribute of y
essence of x — essence of y
Here both x and y share a common attribute. Thus, we speak of the "life"
of both an elephant and a cabbage, for example. Mascall warns, however,
that the attribute shared is never shared equally, for, even though common
attribution is present, the given attribute applied to x is actually
determined by its own nature or essence, while that same attribute applied
to y is moulded according to the essence or mode of being of y.25 The
attributes, then, while applied mutually, are really self-contained and
indigenous to the nature of the items in question. Such an indigeneity
of the attribute has led the scholastic to call this the analogy of
intrinsic attribution.
The result of such analogy is the conclusion that there is no
logical connection or equality in the sense of a basic similarity of
the shared attribute. One student of analogy, T. W. Silkstone, has
argued that this results from a misappropriation of the mathematical
idiom which, when applied for use in theological discourse, yields
the conclusion of equivocation.26 In a mathematical proportion a knowledge-
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yielding pattern is effected only when three of the four terms are given.
Thus, in the proportion 2:3:04:6 knowledge of the left-hand terms allows
for inference of the final term when one of the right-hand terms is known.
The dilemma in using this type of analogy as a mode of theological discourse
is that, strictly speaking, neither the attributes nor the essence of God
can be known according to the Thomistic via negativa.27 Thus, the use
of human attributes to speak of God dissipates into equivocation in spite
of the good intention of the analogy of proportionality. With no link
between the right and left-hand sides of the analogy a ',pseudo -equation,“28
nonsensical by nature, results. It is as fruitful as saying 2:3::Apples:
Oranges.29
It is, however, the contention of Mascall that this chasm of equivocation
can be crossed with the real relation implicit in the notion of First Cause.
The bond between the isolated sides of the analogy of proportionality is
furnished by an:,analogy of attribution (causality). He cites the scholastic
philosopher Garrigou-Lagrange at this point:
In these equations two created terms are known directly, one
uncreated term is known indirectly by way of causality and
we infer the fourth term which is known indirectly in a positive
manner as regards what is analogically common with creatures
and in a negative and relative manner as regards its proper
divine mode.30
The creative act, then, places creation in a participatory relationship
with the perfections of God albeit in a non-essential manner with regard
to quidditive knowledge of Him. Mascall again looks to scholastic
philosophy for this insight:
Analogous perfections are thus not pure relations. They are
perfections which imply in the creature a composition of two
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correlative elements, potentiality and act, but which in God
are pure act. Our intelligence conceives that they are realized
more fully according as they are purified of all potentiality;
in God they exist therefore in the pure state. le thus see that
there are not two unknowns in the proportionality set up by
theology.31
The analogy of being, then, makes analogical predication possible. Creation,
as effect-implying-cause, is rooted in the act of God by which He exists
and stands as a pointer to the effulgent creativity of the Creator. All
attributes participate in such power. So Mascall concludes:
The goodness of God is thus declared to be self-existent goodness, and, as such, identical not merely with God's essence but
with the act by which God exists. Analogy does not enable us
to conceive God's goodness as Identical with his essence but to
affirm it as identical with his existence.32
Knowledge of God's essence, then, is never conceptual. Analogical knowledge
is the only valid insight in that analogies of attribution and proportionality
interlock to explain how predication about God has been going on all along.
In order to affirm the use of analogy Mascall develops a theory of
apprehension which is designed to meet the "sensationalist" (strict positivist)
position on divine knowledge. The author claims that there is an erroneous
dichotomy in force when one asserts that the senses merely apprehend, while
the intellect goes on to reason. Instead, the intellect is apprehensive.
It apprehends not only truths but objects.33 Mascall postulates a threefold theory of apprehension: 1) the essence of perception is not sense
awareness, but intellectual apprehension: "the intellect uses the sensible
phenomenon as an objectum quo, through which it passes to the apprehension
of objectum quod which is the intelligible trans-sensible being"; 2) the
intelligible object is graspedithrough sensible phenomena, not deduced from
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or constructed out of them; 3) an attitude of "involvement, contemplation,
and penetration's is a prerequisite for penetration beneath the sensible
phenomena to the "real intelligible things„ supporting them.3b It is on
such a basis that Mascall is able to affirm that God as cause is perceived
through created effects. This is not, however, to belittle the sense of
Godts mystery. The nature of man's apprehension of trans-sensible entities
remains dim and obscure, yet perceptible nonetheless.35 That very perceptibility
is what makes analogy viable and valid. For, if analogical statements about
God are possible, utilizing as they do words whose primary application is
to finite beings apprehended through senses, then "there must be a certain
affinity between God and finite things which is not excluded by the radical
difference which we have seen to characterize their existential status.n36
Christian imagery, thought, and discourse, then, are anchored in two realms,
both controlled by God: the natural world and the Church. As the effects
allow perceptibility of the divine, so Christian imagery stands as a mode
of apprehension in that
the image or the image-complex, like the word or the word-complex,
is an objectum quo, by the entertainment and contemplation of
which the ndngl Ts able to enter into intimate conitive union
with the reality of which it is a manifestation.)(
God gives great images to the Church, rooted in the natural world and
fulfilled in Christ, so that
in our thought and speech about him as in all else, God does not
destroy the powers of our nature but confirms them and validates
them, even in the act b which he makes them the raw material of
supernature and grace.30
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Criticism
The history of criticism of both the Thomistic doctrine of analogy
and the metaphysical presuppositions undergirding it is varied and complex.
In modern times the critiques of the proofs of God's existence devised
by Immanuel Kant and David Hume have had long-range effects. In the arena
of, systematics Karl Barth's persistent refusal to admit the analogia entis
as a basis for natural knowledge and speaking about God is monumental
of stature in the post-Kantian era. Common to all criticisms, however,
seems to be a general displeasure with a radically analogical theory of
divine knowledge in so far as it is predicated on the notion of causation
or creation. Dorothy Emmet summarizes many of the basic criticisms in
these words;
There may yet be some fundamental relation or relations of
finite actuality to absolute reality transcending it. But
to describe this relation as that of things to a 'First Cause'
will not do, unless more explicit recognition than we find in
St. Thomas's Five Ways is given to the fact that the word
'cause' tan' here be only used analogically. And if the word
'cause' is here only used analogically, can it define the relation in virtue of which we draw analogies?39
If one begins with the fundamental "theistic assumption that God is infinite," which forbids on the philosophical level any genuine "material
mode" of speech about the properties of supernatural beings, then analogy
must explicate analogy.0 And thus,Thomism, dealing as it does with the
absolute uniqueness of God - that primary fact that God is "over against
and above His creation" in a self-subsistent manner, unrelated in any
explicit way,--cannot, despite the doctrine of analogy, rescue itself from
the basic nihilism which broods along the negative way.141In short, without
some similitude in relationship, literally apprehensible as a common logos,
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difficulty haunts the doctrine of analogy. Here McIntyre says:
We must firmly remember that all of our knowledge of God
cannot be analogical; otherwise we would not know that it
Was so. We have to have non-analogical knowledge with which to
compare analogical and by which to judge its accuracy. Here
J. S. Mill's word becomes extremely relevant: theological
inquiry must accept as its goal the reduction of the area of
analogical affirmation...ultimately analogies establish themselves not by their conformity to the rubrics of medieval or
modern logic, or yet ittl the requirements of an anti-metaphysical
metaphysic, but by the living relation in which they stand to
the living Word of God, to the worshipping and obedient community,
and to the salvation of Godfs children.42

CHAPTER III
THE NEOCLASSICAL DOCTRINE CF GOD
In Chapter II the tension between the possibility and impossibility
of theological discourse was discussed. We saw that Thomas Aquinas asserted
three kinds of attribution to God — negative, relational, and positive.
We further discovered that attempts at positive attribution, applying
human predicates to divinity, could be either univocal or equivocal,
necessitating analogical predication. E. L. Mascall contended that
the analogy of attribution or the relational attribution of First Cause
is necessary in order to avoid the agnostic implications of the equivocal
analogy of proportionality which contains isolated terms on either side
of the proportion. He further concludes that both types of analogy must
be retained in theological discourse, the analogy of attribution claiming
a logical priority. A further contention of Mascall was that analogy is
actually a mode of apprehension carried on by the intellect without which
thought of God is impossible. We finally noted that the analogical notion
of "creative causality" was held suspect by some, particularly in the
Kantian tradition, as incapable of yielding literal knowledge of God.
Charles Hartshorne, philosopher of religion in the tradition of
personalism and process philosophy,43takes as a point of departure the
obeisance of this classical tradition to the Infinity of God. The via
..10MM••••••

negative is the fundamental error of that great tradition.44 With the
aid of a cursory overview of his doctrine of God, the metaphysical basis
for his own doctrine of analogy and religious language, we shall investigate
his assertion that the negative attributes of God — infinity, eternity,
immutability, etc, — spell the demise of logical talk about God.
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The judgment that the negative way of Thomism forbids true analogical
discourse is predicated on Hartshorne's understanding of the Thomistic
God as "absolute and totally exempt from relations to the creatures.m45
With regard to analogy he states of the Thomistic doctrine of God:
To say, we know, not God, but something to which we know that
God is analogous, does not meet my argument. Analogy involves
relation, thus: 'fife know there is Something to which the world
is related as effect to cause." If the relation is in God, then
he is relative. If it is in the world, then the world has relation*
to-God, and since this is a complex which includes God, and since;
God has, by hypothesis, only absolute being, the world must include
this absolute being. Otherwise, what the world has is not relationto-God, but relation-to, and nowhere, in the world or in God, is
there any such relation as the analogy involves. So "the analogy
of being" fails to prov4e an answer to the question, what do we
know when we know God?114°
God, then, must be literally related to the world; to assert otherwise,
contends Hartshorne, is to claim the God is unknowable. In a qualified
univocal sense God is temporal and spatial, dependent and complex, conscious
and good, purposive and powerful. God is, however, more than His relations
which obtain with the world. Hartshorne states that the "all" (the world)
is in God, but not co-terminous with Him. Hartshorne disclaims pantheism.
Rather, he holds to a doctrine of "di-polar theism" or "panentheism" which
states that there is a unified polarity in God of finite and infinite,
actual and potential, becoming and fixed being, contingent and necessary
God is the Process-Itself, the process of actualization by which events
become actual, passoon into actuality, the finite "pole" of God, forming
a novel moment of that pole of God and, in turn, furnishing new data
in the process, while together with such a pole the inherent possibility
of future events. He states:
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The inclusive principle [of actualizatiOlis not something utterly
mysterious to be called being, which is neither in contrast nor
not in contrast to becoming, but process itself, with a face of
"actuality" (in the literal sense, for there is here no other),
viewed in one temporal direction, and of “potentialityle viewed
in the other, with an eternal factor of abstract being common to
all such potentiality."
God, then, claims unique metaphysical status not, as in Thomism,
because of what He is not, but because of what He is, namely, positive
"all-relatedness." The negative side of God, His non-relatedness, is
not to be conceived as sheer negativity, but rather as His omni-possibility.
The conjunction of these two facets is designated by Hartshorne as "modal
coincidence," meaning that the necessarily all-inclusive must be one
whose potentiality for change is co-extensive with the logically possible and that God "is the Whole in every categorial sense, all actuality

.
(d*.\

in one individual actuality, and all possibility in one individual
potentiality.115° As the Whole, then, there is no being or principle
save God alone which is the necessary ground of whatever exists or is
even possible.
Hartshorne goes on to claim that God can be conceived as the "infinite personal existence or creative becoming" in the literal sense and
that one can assert
God's independence of the actual world (in his abstract identity)
without saying he is wholly external to it, and one can affirm
his inclusion of the actual world (in his concrete existence)
without denying that the world as actual is completely contingent
and radically dependent on him as its sole necessary ground.5
As Supreme Person, God possesses a determinate "body" or the actual
limitations of finitude as the process-up-to-now; but simultaneously
he possesses the indeterminate freedom which is the freedom to harmonize
all the indeterminate choices of creation or potentiality. Novelty, then,
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is possible only in so far as the infinity of God is the totality of
52
conceivable finite realities, the infinity of his possible finite roles.
God is thus bound in a unique, all-encompassing way to what is $ while
free to become whatever might become. He is that web of interaction as
the "universal individual," "the unity of a sequence of concrete states
of consciousness each connected with the others in the most truly ideal
way by omniscient memory and steadfastness of purpose.“53 God is literally
structurally related to all beings in a universal manner and is relevant
to all contexts. No longer can He afford to be conceived as the "causa
sui" or self-derived being of classical metaphysics.% In short, rather
than a blank substance requiring nothing but itself to exist or Being as
atemporal absolute, God as the paradigmatic self is fully relational,
social, and temporal, the ever-changing process whose immutability consists
in the unique manner in which He integrates the distinct modes of past,
present, and future.55 In the following chapter we shall examine the import of such a doctrine for a theory of analogy and religious language.

CHAPTER IV
HARTSHORNE'S DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE
In Chapter III a brief survey of Hartshorne's doctrine of God
revealed his teaching that God is to be conceived as the eminent Self
who is totally related as the ground of any and all relationships to
a universe of nondivine beings. He is finite in so far as he contains
all actuality, infinite in so far as he is the omnipossibility of
all future and novel relationships. His environment is internal, that
is to say, he can never be spatially and temporally defined locally or
fragmentarily.56 His absolute character consists in his all-relatedness,
abstract in nature, which, while relative to all, is relative to no one
thing externally and so is able to serve as the basis for any and all
realities.
Hartshorne contends that such relatedness is the key to a proper
doctrine of analogy. He says:
It was held that while ordinary individuals interact, God's
superiority is that he acts only (actus purus) and does not
interact. UnforthDately, this destroys illinalogy between
God and creatures.'?
It is the paradigm of self or God as the Cosmic Interacting Whole which
furnishes the basis for religious discourse. The dimension of totality
is the key to understanding the religious definition of the word 'God'.
It is in worship that such a dimension is perceived. Worship is the
"integrating of all one's thoughts and purposes,n58 a consciously unitary
response to life. Such an integrity is possible only in correlation
with the experience of the "cosmic or all-inclusive whole [as] an integrated
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individual, the sole non-fragmentary individual.,69 In the injunctions
for total response which are common to worship (for example, "Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy mind and with
all thy soul and with all thy strength.") lies the implication that every
response must, in fact, be a way of loving God. From this it follows
that God must be related to every experience, for "if God is in all things,
he is in our experiences and also in what we experience, and thus is
in some fashion a universal datum of experience.“6° Thus, in much the
same way as the word 'I' serves as the indicator of integrity for all
human experiences of the self, so God stands as the integrity of all
experience. In worship alone with its apodictic demand for unbroken,
universal response is the presence of deity evoked as the basis of
all reality. Language itself, as part of that total reality, exhibits
the presence of deity. Thus, Hartshorne contends, 'God' is
not simply another word in our language but, if anything
rational, a name for the principle back of every word in
any possible language. He is not merely another topic to
think about, but the all-pervasive medium of knowledge and
things known, t9 recognize whom is a way of thinking about
no matter whom.61
Hartshorne goes on to assert that any denial of God as this necessary,
all-inclusive background of experience and language is an explicit
acceptance of the contingent and the accidental as absolute. Rather,
as the human self binds up its contingent properties in a unified whole
and is the necessary ground of the possibility of contingency, God acts
as Necessary First Cause, not in the sense of external creator, but as
the logical possibility and matrix of accidental occurrences, as the
existent who must exist, even if it is as the experience of the non-being
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of anything. He is the "being which will be there no matter what else
62 As noted above, one cannot deny this without contending
is there."
with the resulting capricious absurdity of conceiving the accidental
as simply accidental.
Hartshorne wishes to distinguish this doctrine of necessity and
causality from the Thomistic doctrine of First Cause as actus purus.
In no way is the necessary independent of the contingent. He says:
Thus,the first cause is not in every sense independent of other
causes, but rather in its essence it depends upon (in the sense
of necessitating or omnipotently requiring) the class of contingent beings as such, while in its accidents the necessary
being (necessary only in essence and as to having some accidents
or oth2;) depends upon just what contingent beings in fact
exist.
The necessary and the contingent, then, constitute one interdependent
reality, the unity and wholeness of which is known in worship and
spoken of in language. In such a scheme the word 'God' operates as
the logical president over all contingent linguistic expressions in
the same manner in which the word 'I' presides over contingent acts
as the necessary possibility of their occurrence.64
Linguistic analysis must take the notion of necessity seriously.
The principle of verification, regarding as it does all existence as
65
contingent, is actually is "impious in principle." Rather, those
concerned with the logic of theological statements should assay theological statements as belonging to the general class of metaphysical
assertions which are not susceptible to the fragmentary metaphysic
of positivism. It is only in such a stance that one will notice that
in worship metaphysical statements take on a specificity of content
which points to the way the variable details of contingent experience
are woven into a constant structure and integrated sense of wholeness.66
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In an article, "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and
Existential," Hartshorne delineates this intimate relationship between
the necessary and the contingent (which is, of course, paralleled by
all the polarities in God - infinite and finite, free and determined,
possible and actual, becoming and fixed being). Here he notes that
there are three categories of linguistic statements. First, there are
ordinary factual statements, fragmentary in character, designated as
partially restrictive of existential (contingent) possibilities.
Secondly, there are completely restrictive statements, wholly negative,
which express an impossible state of affairs such as "nothing exists."
Such a statement is impossible because the verifying experience of it
must exist. Finally, there are completely nonrestrictive statements
which are universal, necessary and existential. He notes these assertions
as follows:
Necessarily, something exists.
Necessarily, experience occurs.
Necessarily, creative synthesis occurs.
Necessarily, there are concrete actualities all of which are
both externally and internally related, both absolute and relative.
Necessarily, divine or infallible experience, having fallible
experience among its objects, occurs.°7
The necessity of such assertions rests in the inconceivability of their
contraries, so that literal assertions about the divine entail "...the
absence of any positive meaning for the denial of a statement or - the
same thing - the failure of the statement to exclude any positive state
of affairs.1168 Metaphysics cannot seek after any partially restrictive
truth, as though God were an infinite fact, but rather seeks to explicate
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what would be real about the world no matter what possibilities were
actualized and which cannot be denied without self-contradiction. At
this point Hartshorne explicitly works within the restraint of
Popper's canon of conceivable falsifiability, that canon which states
that verification in science is not as important as conceivable falsification E9
Theological-metaphysical statements, then,seek to designate the
common factors in all experience:
If 'information, means a description of what distinguishes
one state of affairs from other conceivable states, then
necessary statements are not informative; but if 'information,
includes reference to the factor which all possible positive
states of eiistel)8e have in common, then necessary statements
are informative.'
Ftrthermore„ such statements, drawn as they are from the all-inclusive
process and interrelationship of the necessary and contingent, are
capable of literal application, both in a qualified and strict sense,
to deity. The emergence of a linguistic world or accident from that
',indeterminate determinable potentiality for possible worlds;' which
is the same for Hartshorne as the "necessary," is capable of being
literally denotative of deity in so far as the necessary is the recipient of the accidental and the supreme cause is also the supreme
effect.71 Thus, while the attribution of a fixed aspect of reality
to an aspect of the all-inclusive process is literally correct, it
is infinitely far from a complete description of him. Attributions
are literal in the qualified sense of being an actual portion of reality,
but non-literal in their adequacy to do full justice to the Process Itself.
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Hartshorne combines the above insights into an explicit statement
on religious language in an article entitled, "Three Strata of Meaning
in Religious Discourse." The thetic statement of that article reads
as follows:
God is symbolically ruler, but analogically conscious and
loving, and literally both absolute (or necessary) in
existence and relative (or contingent) in aqIuality - that
is, in the concrete modes of His existence.
Religious language, then, operates on three levels: 1) the symbolic
level; 2) the literal level; 3) the "problematic" or analogical level.
The first stratum deals with material predications concerning deity.
Since God, the Integral Whole, cannot be compared with the part, literal
application of designations like "rock," "shepherd," "fountain," etc.
are not possible. As mentioned previously (supra, p. 22), Hartshorne
feels that the dilemma of positivism with its bewitbhment over the
particular has lost divinity in fragmentariness (not all-encompassing,
integral finitude) and placed him in the class of partially restrictive
statements.73
The second stratum deals with the formal predicates applicable to
deity. Here we deal With metaphysical attributes such as "eternal,"
"immutable," "impassive." While negative in appearance, these are
actually the abstract principles of the concrete identity of the divine
(supra] p. 18, footnote 51). Like those attributes of the human self,
God's attributes are abstract expressions of a concrete web of experience
and, therefore, are positive in content, though negative in form.
These particular formal attributes are radically unlike human ones, however,
in their comprehensiveness. They are meant to
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define that sense of his eminence or perfection which is indeed
statically complete, an absolute maximum. But, because they
are in themselves nothing more than abstractions, they are far
from constituting the whole of his perfection which is something unimaginably concrete: the ever new synthesis into his
own everlastinghand all-embracing life of all that has been or
ever shall be."4
In summary, these formal attributions are positive because concrete
and, in the terms of the article previously mentioned, "existential."
They are literal because they conceptualize according to the canon of
literalness, the principle of all or none, of necessary truth or falsity.
Thus, they are literal (nonrestrictive) and positive expressions of the
universal character of God because he is the all-inclusive participant
(as supreme necessary cause), on the one hand, and all-inclusive relatum
(as supreme contingent effect), on the other hand. Both poles are
literally true and attributable, because as finitude he embraces all
factuality of the process-up-to-now, while as infinitude he tt. Table in
his mode of potentiality to embrace all actual worlds which may come
to be through the contingent acts of creatures.
By way of excursus it is useful to note that Hartshorne has found
argument with Paul Tillichis doctrine of a "super-theistic God" who
is alleged to transcend both poles, thereby rendering di-polar statements non-litera1.75 Tillich, who actually applies the analogy duorum
ad tertium to God as the third entity to which finity and infinity,
being and becoming are related, is guilty, claims Hartshorne, of rendering
all theological discourse innocuous by claiming it is only "symbolic" of
deity. He charges:
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Is it not the case that Tillich's arguments for his more radically
symbolic view are themselves at best symbolic, unable to meet
logical tests? True, Tillich seems at times to argue from BeingItself, which he says is to be taken literally. But how can it
so be taken, when our experience, itself a process, discloses
only processes and what can be abstracted therefrom? A "being"
which is neither any process nor any datal constituent of process,
but something simpliciter more inclusive than all process - this
cannot, it seems, have literal meaning, for nothing of the sort
appears in experiencing. At best, "being" in this sense seems a
reference to traditional metaphysics by faith taken as a symbol
of what no experience could exhibit."
Thus, the desire to place God outside the categories of experience places
Tillich in the classical stream with St. Thomas who deemed the character
of God so beyond human categories that we can only say what He is not.
To repeat, however, the claim of Hartshorne: in the strictly formal sense
we can know the logical meaning of the modal polarities of God which speak
of his all-inclusiveness and which coincide in him.
The third stratum of religious discourse builds on the foregoing
understanding. If God is formally describable as ideally, eminently,
and universally relative, then non-formal descriptions need not be in
logical contradiction:to the formal. Rather, the non-formal are applicable to deity in degrees. Here Hartshorne speaks in terms of psychical
attributes. Since, as he says, "all functions are God-functions,"77 and
the real infinity of God consists in his all-inclusiveness and the
omnipotentiality to be so, religious phrases such as "God loves," "God
wills," "God knows" are capable of literal acceptance when translated
into the form of "all-loving," "all-willing," "all-knowing." As noted
earlier, Hartshorne roots the literal knowledge and applicability of these
psychical concepts in the setting of worship where one gains a "religious
intuition" of the comprehensive character of the word "all," and, hence,
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an intuition of God Himself as the Wholeness of reality. The unconditional demands for total sympathy and care for all reality reflect the all-encompassing care, sympathy and feeling which he bears
for the whole creation. Thus, psychical concepts such as feeling,
memory, sympathy are not really applied analogically to God from creaturely experience. Rather, the reverse is true. In worship comes the
realization of the literal, universal sense of such concepts and this
basic religious insight allows the affirmation that "analogical concepts apply literally to deity and analogically to creatures."78
Hartshorne deems this stratum "problematic" precisely because
human awareness ofdand participation in psychical realities is limited.
Hartshorne urges that we replace the negative theology with a positive
and literal awareness of the formal properties of deity and affirm
a new "negative anthropology."
We see that the term "know" in the human case turns out to
have a rather indefinite meaning. In the divine case, the
matter is simple: God, as infallible, has absolutely conclusive evidence concerning all truths, so that if knowledge
is possession of perfect evidence as to the state of affairs,
then God simply knows - period. No such plain definition will
work for human knowledge. In this sense, it is the theistic
use only of psychical conceptions which has literal meaning,
a meaning from which all other meanings are derived by qualification, diminution or negation. So, instead of the old "negative
theology," one might propose a new "negative anthropology."0
We are, claims Hartshorne, to exploit the "intuition which we have
of God tin worship] ." For, the "awareness of God furnishes a criterion
80
The divine-human contrast stands at the
for the weakness of man."
basis of all human thought and speaking. The problematic nature of
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language at this level is the task of defining the exact scope and limits
of relational reference for each resemblance to deity and to the intuition
of him. It is clear in any case that the participation of human qualities
in the divine standard or logos is not to be denied without destroying
the very possibility of analogy. For example, if God is Father (allcaring, all-loving) he cannot be at the same time unfatherly in essentia
on the pretext that ',similarity to a father in such respects would be
'anthropomorphic' or univocal.u 81 This insistence on forbidding God
positive and literal contents, even in such abstractions as immutability,
eternity and the like, inevitably exposes the theological use of analogy to the charges of vagueness, inappropriateness and self-contradiction.82
An all too negative theology made God the great emptiness, and
an all too negative anthropology made the creatures also empty.
I suggest that nothing is only nothing, that the divine attributes,
are positive, and the creatures' qualities are between these and
nothing.°,

CHAPTER V
IAN T. RAMSEY: AN EXCURSUS
In Chapter IV it was noted that Charles Hartshorne rooted the
linguistic meaning of the word 'God' in the religious experience of
worship. There one learns of integrity by encountering the demands of
total response placed upon the believer. There the primal awareness of
the all-inclusiveness of God is most intense. Hartshorne acknowledges
that such an insight parallels some of the investigations of Ian T.
Ramsey.84 For that reason it may prove profitable to examine a portion
of the writings of Ramsey on religious language.
Ramsey begins, as did Hartshorne, in that realm which he characterizes
as a "characteristically religious situation." These are situations
in which something uoddu occurs and men become aware that they are more
than any of their public behavior.85 At such a point "the ice breakspu
86
"the light dawns," "the penny drops." In short, one is overcome by
a flash of insight. This experience, however, is not merely subjective.
Such a situation has an "objective" character in so far as it is rooted
in empirical language and reality. When empirical phrases are "strained"
to their limits they evoke discernment and ',depth', emerges.87 It so happens
that in this process theological language will arrive at certain tautological functionaries which are to act as "key words," the "ultimates
of explanation."88 Remembering Hartshorne, the tautological is, of course,
the necessary. It resides beyond strict object language. Put otherwise,
our conclusion is that for the religious man “God“ is a key
word, an irreducible posit, an ultimate of explanation ex-
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pressive of the kind of commitment he professes. It is to be
talked about in terms of the object language over which it presides, but only when this object language is qualified; in which
case this qualified object-language becomes also currency for that
odd discernment with which religious commitment, when a is not
bigotry or, fanaticism, will necessarily be associated.u7
Object-language is qualified in several ways for religious use.
The first method is that of negative theology. Negative theology must
describe God obliquely at the cost of positive knowledge and literal
conceptualization. As it stands it has value as an evocative meditative
technique190 in which nay-saying leads to an awareness of the effulgence
of God. Secondly, there is the way of contrasting words like unity,
simplicity, perfection with their opposites. The very logical tension
created inevitably evokes commitment.91 Finally, the third method
distinguishes the "model-qualifier" technique. Qualification refines
the model until commitment occurs. The concept or model of "cause," for
example, is qualified with "first," until the primacy of divinity
is discerned in commitment. All words, if suitably molded and qualified,
will function religiously, that is to say, will evoke discernment-commitment. In an observation again similar to Hartshorne Ramsey claims that
God can be seen in all the words of His creation, if logically qualified
(supra, p.21', footnote 61).92
Theologically, the word 'God' functions and behaves in much the
same way the word 'I' does. From the assertions "I exist" and "God
exists" nothing strictly verifiable can be deduced, yet both function as
the presupposition of personal existence and speaking, on the one hand, and
scientific, cosmic existence and discourse, on the other hand. Finally,

religious language is grounded in the personal...the personal
is not only a category which is never wholly reducible to
scientific terms, but...interlocks with all the divee languages
of science to unite them as a common presupposition."
God, then, is that invariant "which is anchored objectively in a dis—
94
closure situation, when that situation involves the whole universe.11
And in all cases it is in worship that one must seek the plotting,
mapping and qualificational arousal of theological phrases:
Here then is a method by which not only are problems overcame,
but where at every point we ploy and map our theological
phrases with reference to a characteristically religious situation
one of worship, wonder, awe. Without such an empirical anchorage
all our theological thinking is in vain, and where there is
controversy and argument we are to look for their resolution
where they are fulfilled: in, worship.95

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Chapter I
This chapter states the problem in the form of the question: In
what way and to what degree is discourse about God analogical? The
proposal is made to examine the writings of three men in order to draw
a tentative conclusion. These men are E. L. Mascall, a neo-Thomist philosopher, Charles Hartshorne, a philosopher of religion who builds on the
insights of process philosophy, and Ian T. Ramsey. The first and third
of these three are to be understood in relation to Charles Hartshorne.
Chapter II
This study deals cursorily with the Thomistic doctrine of God in
so far as it necessitates a doctrine of analogy. God, who essence is
unknowable, can be spoken of negatively, relationally, or positively. In
the application of positive attributes to God discourse about Him tends
toward one of two polar extremities - univocity or equivocity. Univocity
is suspect of immanentism (pantheism, anthropomorphism); equivocity yields
a radical separation of God and the creature in spite of mutual attribution,
that is to say, words mutually applied do not have a meaningful point of
common reference in experiential reality.
The doctrine of analogy acts as a "middle way,' between such extremes.
Two types of analogy are generally recognized, although interpretations
of them are complex. These are the analogy of attribution and the analogy
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of proportionality. Both these analogies fail to offer a literal, formal
knowledge of God. Analogy of attribution affirms no more than that
God is able to cause the effects spoken of in language; analogy of proportionality offers no literal knowledge of either the third or fourth
term on the right side of a proportion comparing the creature (and his
mode of being) and God (and his mode of being). Mascall affirms that
the equivocation which results from the absence of a third-term knowledge
can be overcome through-the postulation of an analogy of attribution or
"creative causality", God's existential relation with the world, which,
in turn:interlocks with the analogy of proportionality to explain how
talk about God has been possible all along. Such an affirmation is
based upon a theory of religious cognition which recognizes that things,
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truth and trans-sensible reality are all known by the intellect through
sensible phenomena as the medium of cognition. Thus, the substantial
is grasped through the accidental; the relationship between cause and
effect is interdependent.
This chapter concludes with a short perusal of some more general
criticisms which a radical doctrine of analogy has had to endure. Citations
from Dorothy Emmet and John McIntyre as representative samples reveale_
that some literal or essential knowledge of God's basic character was
necessary before analogical speaking is:-able to claim validity.
Chapter III
This study surveys briefly the "neoclassical" or "panentheistic"
doctrine of God as the basis of a doctrine of analogy and religious
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language. The study proffers Hartshorne's doctrine of "di-polar theism"
which states that finitude and infinitude, actuality and potentiality,
necessity and contingency are supremely present as the polarities of
Process-Itself. God's nature is seen to be social in nature and, therefore, personal and interactive in the eminent sense. God is universally
related to all finitude and, therefore, is supremely abstract and supremely
concrete. He is also both determined by the acts of creatures which
comprise his finitude and yet free in his omnipotentiality to accept
and harmonize whatever world may come to be.
Chapter IV
This chapter indicates how the all-relatedness of God is brought to
bear in a doctrine of analogy and religious language. The Self, being
universal in its relations, acts as the universal datum of experience,
of which linguistic experience claims importance. It is in the setting
of worship that linguistic experience is best utilized for religious
discourse. In that setting the dimension of totality directs the worshipper to perceive that God is implicit in all dimensions of experience
in much the same way the word 'I' functions as common to all experience
of the human self. This awareness is a realization through the religious
intuition of the all-encompassing nature of God of the necessity of
experience, the absence of which is impossible and which serves as the
cohesive factor to which the word 'God' is applicable. All language is
to be seen in the light of that necessity. For that reason theological
statements fall into the same class as metaphysical statements. Such
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assertions take seriously both the completely nonrestrictive (necessary)
and existential (contingent) aspects of Reality as Process. This is
another way of saying that the accidental is dependent upon the necessary.
Three classes of theological assertion are noted in Hartshorne's
writing: symbolic, literal and analogical. Symbolical statements are
classed so because they deal with a fragmentary portion of reality
inadequate for description of the Whole. Literal:religious discourse is
based on those abstract principles which spmmPrize the infinite (as
temporal magnitude) concrete identity of the Process-Itself. They include negatively formulated attributesj but are nonetheless formally
positive and literal in so far as they are universals rooted in a concrete reality. Analogical concepts are based on the literal intuition of
divinity available in the religious experience of all-relatedness. Such
concepts are literally applicable to deity according to the nature of the
intuition and are analogically applicable to creatures according to the
degree to which they are able to approximate the activity of God. Thus,
Hartshorne suggests a negative anthropology in which ..one is capable of
only dimly perceiving the way in which man loves, knows,.feels, etc., while
fully capable in the religious intuition of the divine of perceiving
the way in which God carries out psychical activities, namely, totally.
All psychical experience, then, must claim degrees of diminution in comparison with the intensity and universality of the divine standard.
Chapter V
In his own explication of religious language Charles Hartshorne in-
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timates awareness of the writings of Ian T. Ramsey. This chapter aims to
draw on that intimation by treating Ian T. Ramsey as an illuminative
parallel. Ramsey, like Hartshorne, finds that empirical phrases take
on religious significance in a "characteristically religious situation."
Words and verifiable experience are pushed to a logical limit, after which
something "odd" occurs and "discernment" is evoked. At the basis of such
discernment are "key words" which stand at the apex of experience as
"ultimates of explanation." These words go beyond the objective as the
very matrix of its occurrence.
All language must be qualified through negation, contrast, or
qualification in order to function religiously. Such a process yields
commitment wherein 'God' functions, like III, as the fundamentum of
cosmic experience, tautological, unverifiable, yet unfalsifiable and
therefore present in all forms of experience as the presupposition of
its possibility and meaning. Such an awareness of the Necessary occurs
pre-eminently in the setting of worship.
Concluding Remarks
The initial query concerning the manner in and the degree to which
discourse about God is analogical may now be answered in several ways.
First, the alternative of E. L. Mascall is to claim an analogical
epistemology in which all awareness of God is indirect and analogical,
although valid. This might be designated mitigated equivocation mitigated because knowledge and discourse does in fact occur, equivocation
because of the reticence to admit full and literal conceptualization and
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discourse about the divine. Secondly, the option of Charles Hartshorne
is to stress that analogy is possible only on the basis of literal
apprehension. Such a literal apprehension is available, and here he
receives support from Ian T. Ramsey, in the situation of worship. In
so far as all reality is a continuum-in-process the very disjunction
between the world and God implicit in the theism of Thomas is avoided
by Hartshorne and analogy is allegedly restored to a status of logical
respectability by literally basing analogy on experience of the divine
as all-related. The position of both Hartshorne and Ramsey might be
designated as reasonable or qualified univocity - reasonable and qualified
because discourse about God participates in the lbgical class of metaphysically universal and necessary statements, univocity because the status
of the empirical world and empirical language as a polar reality of God
(his accidental nature) is not to be derogated.
These respective positions of mitigated equivocity, on the one hand,
and reasonable univocity,on the other hand, tend to result in essentially
different ways of formulating the question of divine knowledge and referential religious language. The Thomistic position tends to ask, "How
can that which is essentially beyond all experience be legitimately conceptualized and spoken of as personal?fl Expectedly, it tends to respond,
as did Mescal', with an analogical epistemology inherent in its suppositions.
The neoclassical position of Hartshorne phrases the question rather, "In
what manner can the supremely relative Self be appropriately conceived
and spoken of in an absolute manner?" It responds in kind with a theory
of religious language that is based on the manner in which the word 'I'
is used in human experience.
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In both cases there are difficulties. First, in the case of Mascall
it is held dubious by some that phenomenal reality can really act as an
indicator of the divine without some formal knowledge which may serve
as a standard of comparison. Those who tend to disagree- with Mascall's
position would ask whether such an insistence on the radically analogical
nature of knowledge and speaking of the divine may tend to degenerate into
a pious form of projection, a kind of pseudo-analogy which knows in the
fullest sense no ground of predication but casts some form of intra
experiential relation, for example, "cause,'' on to a transcendent real
which is strictly unknowable? Those who agree would most likely respond
that one may not project exnept upon something and that the very projected
image when magnified according to the infinite. extension of the divine
indeed furnishes the awareness. Secondly, the reasonable univocity of
Hartshorne may possibly be more radically analogical than seems apparent
at first glance. Although he is attempting to derive a non-analogical
metaphysic, is not his very model dependent on his selection of that
reality which is to serve analogously, namely, the self? Furthermore,
what is the validity of basing a literal knowledge of God upon a religious
intuition available in worship? Again, how does one relate to a formal
aspect of divinity? How does Hartshorne's theory of completely nonrestrictive statements hold up under the critique of Collingwood, Carnap
and others who would contend that universals of being merely represent
the limiting case, of the abstractive process? Would such a criticism
tend to destroy the infinite pole of Hartshorne's God and reinstate the
supremacy of the contingent as the necessary.96 Is it possible that deference to the necessary in order to establish the possibility of the possible

is an act of faith? Have not the radical empiricists gotten on quite well
with the brute fact of contingency?
Such are the questions which this study has generated. In the
intricate search for establishing a valid human basis for the perception
of the divine one pauses to wonder with McIntyre whether that phenomenological
emergence of God in unhiddenness and disclosure of Himself must not
serve as that literal standard by which we speak of and praise Him.
The philosophers have helped us to see that analogies must be
carefully scrutinised for positive and negative content, and
graded accordingly. But ultimately analogies establish themselves not by their conformity to the rubrics of medieval or
modern logic, or yet to the requirements of an anti-metaphysical
metaphysic, but by the living relation in which they stand to
the living Word of God, to the worshipping and obedient community,
and to the salvation of God's children.97

FOOTNOTES
1 Nels C. Nielsen, Jr., "Analogy as a Principle of Theological Method
Historically Considered," The Heritage of Christian Thought, edited by
Robert E. Cushman and Egil Grislis (New York: Harper and Row, 1965),
passim.
2
Albert William Levi, Philosophy and the Modern World (Bloomingtont
Indiana University Press, 1959), pp. 344-3115.

3 John McIntyre, "Analogy," Scottish Journal of Theology, XII
(March, 1959), P. 4.

4 S.W.Taylor,

"Analogical Thinking in Theology," Scottish Journal of
Theology, XVII (September, 1964), P. 279.

5 John Macquarrie, God—Talk (Evanston: Harper and Row, 1967), P. 215.
6
Schubert M. Ogden, The Reality of God and Other Essays;(New York:
Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 105ff.
7 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Q. 12, Art. 12, I answer, in
The Basic Writings of Thomas Aquinas, edited by Anton PegiiTigiYork:
Random House, 1944).
8 Ibid., Q. 3, Art. 1, I answer.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., Q. 3, Art. 2, I answer.
11 Ibid., 4. 13, Art. 2, I answer.
12 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I, Chapter 30, in
The Basic Writings of Thomas Aquinas, edited by Anton Pegis (New York:
Random House, 1944).

13 Ibid., Book I, Chapter 33.
14 Nielsen, p. 197.
15 Frederick Ferre, Language, Logic and God (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1961), p. 68.
16 Ibid.p. 69.

17 George P. Klubertanz, S. J., St. Thomas Aquinas On Analogy (Chicago:
Loyola University Press, 1960), p. 111.
18 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I, Chapter 34.
19

Ibid.

20 E. L. Mascall, EXistence and Analogy (New York: Longmasns, Green and
Company, 1949), p. 101.
21 Ferre, p. 70.
22 Mascall, p. 103.
23

Gustave Weigel, S. J., utlyth, Symbol and Analogy," Religion and Culture:
Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich, edited by Walter Leibrecht (New York:
harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 127.
24 Mascall, p. 103.
25 Ibid.,pp. 104ff.
26

T. W. Silkstone, "Analogy," Theology, 70 (November, 1967), p. 504.

27 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I, Chapter 30.
28 Ferre, p. 73.
29 Silkstone, p. 504.
30 Mascall, p. 112.
31
Ibid., p. 111.
32 Ibid., p. 120
33 Eric Lionel Mascall, Words and Images: A Study in Theological Discourse (New Yorkr Ronald Press Company, 1957), pp. 63, 66.
34 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
35 Ibid., pp. 82, 87.
36 Ibid., p. 105.
37 Ibid., p. 112.
38 Ibid., pp. 125-126.

43

39 Dorothy M. Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking (London:
Macmillan and Company Ltd., 1945), p. 130.
140 Ferrel p. 76.
41 Nielsen, p. 210.

42 McIntyre, p. 20.
Charles Hartshorne, "Tillich and the Other Great Tradition," Anglican
Theological Review, 43 (July, 1961), p. 249.

44 Ibid., p. 248.
45 Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of
God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 194b), p. 15.

46 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
47 Charles Hartshorne, "Tillichls Doctrine of God," The Theology of Paul
Tillich, edited by Charles W. Kegly and Robert W. Bretall (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 166.
148 Ibid., p. 178.
49 Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, p. 31.
50
Charles Hartshorne, A Natural Theology For Our Time (Lasalle: Open
Court Publishing Company, 1967), p. 201.
51 Ogden, p. 62.
52
Charles Hartshorne, "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential
Judgments," The Relevance of Whitehead, edited by Ivor Leclerc (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 10d.

53 Ibid., p. 117.
54 Ogden, p. 151.
55 Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process: Studies in Metaphysics
and Religion (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), passim.
56
Ogden, p. 60.

57 Charles Hartshorne, "Abstract and Concrete Approaches to Deity,"
Union Seminary Quarterly Review, 20,3 (March, 1965), p. 268.

1414

58 Hartshorne, Natural Theology, pp. 14-5.
59 Ibid., p. 7.
60
61

Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid., p. 79.

62

Charles Hartshorne, "Cause," An Encyclopedia of Religion, edited
by Vergilius Ferm (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1945), p. 1314.
63
Ibid.
64
Charles Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in
Neoclassical Metaphysics (Lasalle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1962),
p. 131.
65
Ibid.
66
Ogden, p. 93.
67
Charles Hartshorne, "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and
Existential," Review of Metaphysics, XXI (September, 1958), P. 147.
68
Ibid.
69 Hartshorne, Logic, p. 87.
70

71

Hartshorne, "Metaphysics and Modality," p. 112f.
Ibid., p. 113.

72 Hartshorne, Logic, p. 1140.
73 Hartshorne, "Tillich and the Other Great Tradition%
p. 2149.
714 Ogden, p. 61.
75 Hartshorne, "Tillich's Doctrine of God", p. 166.
76
Ibid., p. 195.
77
Charles Hartshorne, "The Idea of God - Literal or Analogical?", The
Christian Scholar, 39,2 (June, 1956), p. 135.
78 Hartshorne, Logic, p. 141.

45

79 Ibid.
80 Hartshorne, “Tillich and the Other Great Tradition",
p. 254.
81
Charles Hartshorne, "Analogy," An Encyclopedia of Religion, edited
by Vergilius Ferm (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1945), p. 18.
82

Ibid., p. 19.

83 Hartshorne, Logic, p. 147.
84 Ibid., pp. 131, 140.
85 Ian T. Ramsey, Religious Lauage:
ng
An Empirical Placing of Theological
Phrases (London: SCM Press, 1957), p. 15.

86 Ibid., p. 17.
87
p. 39.
88 Ibid., p. 40.
89 Ibid., p. 47.
90 Ibid., p. 53.
91 Ibid., p. 55.
92 Ibid., p. 80.
93 Ian T. Ramsey, Religion

and Science: Conflict and Synthesis; Some
Philosophical Reflections (London: S. P. C. K. Press, 1964), p. 71..

94 Ibid., p.
73.

95 Ramsey, Religious

Language, p. 89.

96 Bernard Kelly, The Metaphysical Background of Analogy (London:
Blackfriars Publication, 1950, p. 5.
97 McIntyre, p. 20.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. Primary Sources
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theological in The Basic Writings of Thomas
Aquinas. Edited by Anton Pegis. New York: Random House, 1944.
Summa Contra Gentiles, in The Basic Writings of Thomas Aquinas.
Edited by Anton Pegis. New York: Random House, 1944.
Hartshorne, Charles. "Abstract and Concrete Approaches to Deity,"
Union Seminary Quarterly Review, XX (March, 1965).
A Natural Theology For Our Time. Lasalle: Open Court Publishing
Company, 1967.
”Analogyl n An Encyclopedia of Religion. Edited by Vergilius Ferm.
New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1945.
-----. "Cause," An Encyclopedia of Religion. Edited by Vergilius Ferm.
New York: Ph' osophical Library, Inc., 1945.
-----. "Metaphysical statements as Nonrestrictive and Existential,"
Review of Metaphysics, XXI (September, 1958).
"Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," The
Relevance of Whitehead. Edited by Ivor Leclerc. New York: TFie
Macmillan Company, 1961.
- ---. "Process as Inclusive Category: A Reply," The Journal of
Philosophy, 52 (1955).
- -. Reality as Social Process: Studies in Metaphysics and Religion.
Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953.
-----. The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1948.
---. "The Idea of God - Literal or Analogical?," The Christian Scholar,
39 (June, 1956).
-----. The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics. Lasalle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1962.
"Tillich and the Other Great Tradition," Anglican Theological
Review, 43 (July, 1961).
“Tillichls Doctrine of God," The Theology of Paul Tillich.
Edited by Charles W. Kegly and. Robert W. Breta 1. New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1961.

147

-----. "What Did Anselm Discover?," Union Seminary Quarterly Review,
17 (March, 1962).
-----. "Whitehead and Berdyaev: Is There Tragedy in Gal?," Journal of
Religion, XXXVII (1957).
Mascall, E. L. Existence and Analogy. New York: Longmans, Green and
Company, 1949.
Words and Images: A Study in Theological Discourse. New York:
Ronald Press Company, 1957.
Ramsey, Ian T. Religious Language: An Empirical Placing of Theological
Phrases. London: SCM Press, 1957.
-----. Religion and Science: Conflict and Synthesis, Some Philosophical
Reflections. London: S. P. C. K. Press, 1964.

B. Secondary Sources
Anderson, James F. The Bond of Being. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Company,
1949.
Dillistone, F. W. "How Far Must Theological Thinking Proceed by Analogy?,"
London Quarterly and Holborn Review, 187 (October, 1962).
Emmet, Dorothy M. The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking. London: The
Macmillan Company, 1945.
Farrer, Austin Marsden. Faith and Speculation. New York: New York
University Press, 1967.
-----. Finite and Infinite. Westminster: Dacre Press, 1943.
Gallagher, Kenneth T. The Philosophy of Knowledge. New York: Sheed and
Ward, 1964.
Hatchett, M. J. "Charles Hartshorne's Critique of Christian Theology,"
Anglican Theological Review, 48 (July, 1966).
Hepburn, Ronald W. Christianity and Paradox. London: C.
Company, 1958.

A. Watts and

Hick, John. Faith and the Philosophers. New York: St. Martin's Press,
Inc., 1964.
Hook, Sidney, editor. Religious Experience and Truth. New York: New
York University Press, 1961.

48
Kelly, Bernard. The Metak'hysical Background of Analogy. London:
Blackfriars Publication, 1958.
Klubertanz, George P., S. J. St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy. Chicago:
Loyola University Press, 1960.
Levi, Albert William. Philosophy and the Modern World. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1959.
McIntyre, John. "Analogy," Scottish Journal of Theology, XII (March, 1959).
Macquarrie, John. God-Talk. Evanston: Harper and Row, 1967.
Nielsen, Nels C., Jr. "Analogy as a Principle of Theological Method
Historically Considered," The Heritage of Christian Thought.
Edited by Robert E. Cushman and Egil Grisles. New York: Harper
and Row, 1965.
-----. "Analogy in Christian Philosophy," Anglican Theological Review,
35 (July, 1953).
-----. "Roman Catholic Magisterium and the Analogy of Being," The
Lutheran Quarterly, 8 (August, 1956).
Norburn, Greville. "Philosophy as Analogy," Church Quarterly Review,
153 (April-June, 1952).
Ogden, Schubert M. "Bultmann's Demythologizing and Hartshorne's Dipolar
Theism," Process and Divinity: The Hartshorne Festschrift. Edited
by William L. Reese and Eugene Freeman. Lasalle: Open Court
Publishing Company, 1964.
-----. "The Possibility and Task of Philosophical Theology," Union
Seminary Quarterly Review, 20,3 (March, 1965).
-----. The Reality of God and Other Essays. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.
Reese, William L. "Analogy, Symbolism and Linguistic Analysis," Review
of Metaphysics, XIII (March, 1960).
Silkstone, T. W. "Analogy," Theology, 70 (November, 1967).
Song, Choan-seng. "The Possibility of Analogical Discourse on God,"
South East Asia Journal of Theology, 7,2 (October, 1965).
Taylor, W. S. "Analogical Thinking in Theology," Scottish Journal of
Theology, 17 (September, 1964).

49
Walton, Gilbert. "Facts and Artifacts,” The Modern Churchman, 7 (J4y,
1964).
Weigel, Gustave, S. J. ',Myth, Symbol and Analogy,► Religion and Culture:
Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich. Edited by Walter Leibrecht. Neu
York: Harper and Brothers, 1959.
Woods, G. F. "The Use of Analogy in Christian Theology," Scottish
Journal of Theology, 7 (October, 1956).

